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CREDITOR CLAIMS IN ARBITRATION
AND IN COURT
ChristopherR. Drahozal* and Samantha Zyontz**

I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2009, the world of debt collection arbitration was turned
upside down.' In settlement of a lawsuit brought by the Minnesota
Attorney General alleging fraud and deceptive practices, 2 the National
Arbitration Forum (NAF) on July 17, 2009, agreed permanently to stop
administering new consumer arbitrations.3 The NAF was far and away the
largest provider of debt collection arbitration services, having administered
an estimated 214,000 debt collection cases in 2006.4

* John M. Rounds Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development,
University of Kansas School of Law.
** Senior Research Associate, Searle Civil Justice Institute, George Mason University School of
Law. We are grateful to the Searle Civil Justice Institute and the University of Kansas School of Law
for their support, financial and otherwise, for this project. We very much appreciate the cooperation of
the American Arbitration Association, especially Bill Slate, Richard Naimark, Ryan Boyle, India
Johnson, and Eric Tuchmann. Thanks to Henry Butler and Geoff Lysaught for their oversight and
encouragement. Jon Klick, Jason Johnston, Ron Allen, and Josh Wright, as well as members of the
Searle Board of Overseers, provided helpful comments on this project and on drafts of this article.
Richard Hynes graciously shared his data on debt collection cases in Virginia state courts, and Thomas
Cohen and Nicole Waters answered our questions on the availability of state court data. Thanks also to
Elise Nelson and Matthew Sibery for their help in compiling and processing the data and in ensuring the
accuracy of this article.
1. The vast majority of cases arising out of disputes between businesses and consumers, both in
court and in arbitration, involve claims by creditors seeking to recover amounts allegedly owed by the
consumers. Colloquially, court cases arising out of such claims are referred to as "debt collection
litigation," while arbitrations are referred to as "debt collection arbitration." We use those phrases in
this article because they are in common usage in the public policy arena. See generally, e.g., FEDERAL
TRADE COMM'N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION

LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (July 2010), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollection
report.pdf. By using the phrases, we do not mean to suggest that the amounts sought to be recovered
necessarily are owed by the consumers-i.e., that they are, in fact, debts of the consumer defendant or
respondent.
2. Complaint at 3, Minnesota v. National Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18559 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. July 14, 2009), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/PressReleases/SignedFiled
ComplaintArbitrationCompany.pdf [hereinafter Minnesota Complaint].
3. Consent Judgment, 3, Minnesota v. National Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18559
(Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009), available at http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf
4. Minnesota Complaint, supra note 2, 80, at 29.
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Shortly thereafter, the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
announced that it was imposing a moratorium on its own administration of
most consumer debt collection cases.5 The AAA did not impose its
moratorium in response to pending litigation,' but rather did so based on its
"experiences administering debt collection arbitrations" and "its
consideration of a number of policy concerns that have been raised."' The
moratorium extends to the following types of cases:
[C]onsumer debt collection programs or bulk filings and individual case
filings in which the company is the filing party and the consumer has not
agreed to arbitrate at the time of the dispute and the case involves a
credit card bill or, the case involves a telecom bill or the case involves a
consumer finance matter. 8
The AAA continues to administer individual claims brought by other
creditors against consumers, such as claims by law firms and accounting
firms seeking to recover unpaid fees, as well as cases involving a telecom
bill, credit card bill, or other consumer finance matter that arises out of a
post-dispute agreement to arbitrate.
This article examines the outcomes of AAA debt collection
arbitrations (in cases resolved prior to the moratorium), as well as the
outcomes of debt collection cases in court. The potential implications of
this research are twofold. First, it provides possible insights into how
consumers might fare if debt collection cases are resolved in court instead
of in arbitration. Many consumer arbitration clauses continue to provide
for NAF or AAA arbitration. To evaluate whether consumers might be
better off if debt collection claims arising out of those contracts are
resolved in court instead of arbitration, a comparison of creditor claims in
arbitration and in court is necessary.
Second, and more importantly, it adds new information to the policy
debate over consumer arbitration. The most commonly cited studies of
asserted bias in consumer arbitration examine outcomes in debt collection
arbitrations. 9 Some critics of consumer arbitration assert that the high win
5. Press Release, American Arbitration Association, The American Arbitration Association Calls for
Reform of Debt Collection Arbitration (July 23, 2009), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5769.
6. Id.
7. Arbitration or Arbitrary: The Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts:
Hearing Be/bre the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. On Oversight, I11Ith Cong. (July

22, 2009) (testimony of Richard W. Naimark on Behalf of the American Arbitration Association),
availableat http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/200907221 12616.pdf
8. Notice on Consumer Debt Collection Arbitrations, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id =:36427 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
9. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE

CONSUMERS (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf (studying
arbitrations administered by the National Arbitration Forum); see also SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST.,
CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT

115 app. I (Mar. 2009) (summarizing studies), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
searlecenter/uploads (Consumero20Arbitration%2Ofull report.pdf; Christopher R. Drahozal &
Samantha Zyontz, Consumer Arbitration Be/ore the American Arbitration Association, 25 OH IO J. ON
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rate of business claimants in such cases alone shows that arbitration is
biased in favor of businesses."o Others compare the win rate of business
claimants in arbitration to the win rate of consumer claimants in arbitration,
concluding that the higher win rate of business claimants provides evidence
of bias."
These numbers do not in themselves show that arbitration is a biased
means of resolving consumer disputes. Despite suggestions to the contrary,
a high win rate for business claimants does not alone show bias. The win
rate is only meaningful in comparison to some baseline.' 2 A fifty percent
win rate for claimants may be extremely high if claimants bringing similar
claims tend to win at a lower rate in court, or extremely low if claimants
bringing similar claims tend to win at a higher rate in court. The same is
true of a ninety-percent win rate or even a ninety-nine percent win rate.
Nor does comparing the win rates of business claimants to the win
rates of consumer claimants provide evidence of bias in arbitration. As we
have explained elsewhere, the differing win rates for business claimants
and consumer claimants appear to result from two factors, neither of which
provides evidence of bias." First, the types of claims businesses bring in
arbitration tend to differ from the types of claims consumers bring."
(forthcoming 2010). We have not studied arbitrations administered by the NAF, and
Disp. RESOL.
offer no opinions on those arbitrations.
10. E.g., Letter from Professors of Consumer Law and Banking Law to Senators Dodd and Shelby
and Congressmen Frank and Bachus, Statement in Support of Legislation Creating a Consumer
Financial Protection Agency 6 (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Media/
consumer-law%209-28-09.pdf ("Studies have found the arbitrators find for companies against
consumers 94 to 96% of the time, suggesting that arbitration providers are responding to the incentive
to find for those who select them: the companies that insert their names in their form contracts.");
Elizabeth Warren, Deathstar Arbitration, CREDIT SLIPS (Sept. 27, 2007, 3:55 PM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2007/09/deathstar-arbit.html#more ("The data suggest, however,
that [arbitration] is Darth Vader's Death Star-the Empire always wins.").
11. E.g., Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit CardIndustry Using It to Quash Legal Claims?:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, IllIth Cong. 148 (2009) (testimony of David Arkush stating that in success rates and award
amounts, AAA arbitrations appear to be heavily slanted in favor of businesses); American Association
for Justice, Searle Institute Report Shows Mandatory Arbitration Favors Corporations Over
Consumers, AM. ASS'N FOR JUSTICE, http://wwwjustice.org/resources/searle-arbitration-rebut.pdf (last
visited Oct. 27, 2009) ("While the authors try to paint a rosy picture of the mandatory arbitration
process, the data actually illustrates otherwise"--citing the differing outcomes between business and
consumer claimants).
12. Richard Lempert, A Classic at 25: Reflections on Galanter's 'Haves 'Article and Work It Has
Inspired, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1099, 1110 (1999); see also MAINE BUREAU OF CONSUMER CREDIT
PROTECTION, REPORT TO COMMITTEE: COMPILATION OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY CONSUMER

ARBITRATION PROVIDERS 7 (Apr. 1, 2009) ("[A]lthough credit card banks or assignees prevail in most

arbitrations, this fact alone does not necessarily indicate unfairness to consumers. The fact is that the
primary alternative to arbitration (a civil action in court) also commonly results in judgment for the
plaintiff."), available at http ://www.maine.gov/pfr/consumercredit/documents/ArbitrationProviders
Report.rtf.
13. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 9, at 70.
14. Businesses tend to bring claims for amounts they are owed for goods provided and services
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Second, business claims are much more likely than consumer claims to be
resolved on an ex parte basis-i.e., when the respondent fails to appear.'
Instead, the proper basis for comparison is to similar cases in court.
Court adjudication is the default means of dispute resolution. Parties that
agree to arbitrate contract out of that default. To evaluate arbitration
meaningfully thus requires a comparison to the likely means by which the
disputes otherwise would be resolved. Indeed, implicit, if not explicit, in
legislative proposals to restrict the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses is that the disputes that previously would have been resolved in
arbitration would instead be resolved in court.
In this article, we seek to undertake such a comparison. We compare
debt collection cases brought by business claimants in arbitration- both
individual AAA debt collection arbitrations and cases brought under a
program of debt collection arbitrations administered by the AAA- to debt
collection cases brought in court.
Our central findings are as follows:
* In the court cases studied, creditors won some relief as often,
or more often, than in the arbitration cases studied (i.e.,
consumers prevailed more often in arbitration than in court).
Creditors won some relief in 86.2 percent of the individual
AAA debt collection arbitrations and 97.1 percent of the AAA
debt collection program arbitrations that went to an award.
By comparison, creditors won some relief in 98.4 percent to
one-hundred percent of the debt collection cases in court that
went to judgment. Even after controlling for differences
among the types of cases and the venue in which they were
brought using multivariate regression analysis, the likelihood
of creditors winning in arbitration is less than in court, both
for individual AAA debt collection arbitrations and for AAA
debt collection program arbitrations.
* In the court cases studied, prevailing creditors were awarded
as high a percentage, or a higher percentage, of what they
sought than in the arbitration cases studied (i.e., consumers

already rendered. In such cases, the business faces fewer hurdles to establishing liability, and, when it
does so, the amount it should be awarded is relatively easy to calculate and prove. Consumers tend to
bring claims alleging delivery of defective goods or improper performance of services. Such cases tend
to present more difficult questions of proving both liability and damages. Accordingly, consumers tend
to win less often in cases that make it to an award, and, when they do win, tend to recover a lower
percentage of the damages they seek.
15. Cf NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SMALL CLAIMS & TRAFFIC COURTS: CASE MANAGEMENT
PROCEDURES, CASE CHARACTERISTICS, AND ITCOMES IN 12 URBAN iURISDICTIONS 51-52 (102)

("Differences in the winnng percentages for business and individual plaintiffs are probably due to
differences in the nature of the cases brought by businesses and individuals. Businesses bring primarily
debt collection cases, a great majority of which are uncontested (disposed by default). Individuals
usually bring consumer or tort cases, which are more likely to go to trial."); see also in/ta Part Ill.D.
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fared better, or at least no worse, by this measure in arbitration
than in court). Prevailing creditors were awarded 92.9 percent
of the amount sought in the individual AAA debt collection
arbitrations and 99.2 percent in the AAA debt collection
program arbitrations we studied. By comparison, prevailing
creditors were awarded from 96.2 percent to 99.5 percent of
the amount sought in the debt collection cases in court that we
studied. After controlling for differences among the cases
using multivariate regression analysis, we found no
statistically significant difference between creditor recovery
rates in arbitration and in court.
* The rate at which debt collection cases were disposed of other
than by award or judgment (e.g., by dismissal, withdrawal, or
settlement) did not appear to differ systematically between
arbitration and litigation. Just under half (44.8 percent) of the
individual AAA debt collection arbitrations studied were
disposed of other than by award, while 13.2 percent of the
AAA debt collection program arbitrations studied were
disposed of other than by award. By comparison, 22.1 percent
to 35.0 percent of the debt collection cases in court that we
studied were disposed of other than by judgment.
* The rate at which consumers responded (i.e., did not default)
also did not appear to differ systematically between arbitration
and litigation. In the individual AAA debt collection cases we
studied, consumers responded in between 65.7 percent and
79.0 percent of the cases. In the AAA debt collection
program arbitrations we studied, consumers responded in
between 1.9 percent and 14.8 percent of the cases. By
comparison, the consumer response rate in the court cases we
studied ranged from 6.9 percent to 41.2 percent.' 6
These findings are subject to several important limitations.' 7 First, our
findings on outcomes in arbitration are limited to debt collection
arbitrations administered by the AAA. As have we indicated elsewhere,
16. As discussed infra Part Ill.D, the lower number in the range is the percentage of cases in which
we have a high degree of confidence that the consumer responded, while the higher number is the
percentage of cases in which the consumer might have responded.
17. This article focuses on claims brought by creditors against consumers. A similar comparison
could be done for claims brought by consumers against businesses. Again, evaluating arbitration
outcomes for consumer claimants requires a comparison to comparable cases brought by consumers in
court. This comparison is more difficult than for creditor claims for at least two reasons. First,
consumers appear to bring fewer cases against businesses than businesses bring against consumers. In
our sample of Oklahoma cases seeking under $10,000, consumer claimants brought two cases against
businesses while business claimants brought 419 cases against consumers. In our sample of Oklahoma
small claims cases, consumer claimants brought six cases against businesses while business claimants
brought 330 cases against consumers. Second, the greater variation in types of claims brought by
consumers against businesses makes identifying comparable cases more difficult.

82

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 7:1

not all arbitrations are the same. We have not studied arbitrations
administered by other providers, and do not assert that AAA debt collection
arbitrations necessarily are representative of all other consumer
Relatedly, the number of individual debt collection
arbitrations.
arbitrations administered by the AAA during the sample period is small
relative to the number of debt collection cases in court and the number of
cases administered by the AAA under a single debt collection arbitration
program. Thus, caution must be used in drawing conclusions from the
comparison.
Second, the sample of court cases is not from a nationwide sample,
but rather is limited by data availability to cases from Oklahoma and
Virginia state courts, and student loan cases in federal court. The results
are broadly consistent with each other, and with prior studies of small
claims and other courts.18 But results may differ in different courts.
Third, the cases in court and in arbitration that we studied likely are
not fully comparable. We have focused on debt collection cases to enhance
comparability, and have sought to control for important differences among
the cases (such as amount sought, type of claimant, and venue in which the
case was brought) through multiple regression analysis. But differences no
doubt remain. Indeed, the fact that some of the cases are resolved in
18. See, e.g., DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT

221 (1974) (finding more than 90% of debt collection actions in Chicago, Detroit, and New York
resolved by default judgment); NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 15, at 51 (finding default
judgments in favor of business claimants in from 93 %-100% of cases in cities studied, with exception
of Seattle, which had a default judgment rate of 80%); Marc Galanter, Contract in Court: Or Almost
Everything You May or May not Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577, 600

(using data on federal diversity actions, excluding personal injury cases, from 1986-94; finding that
corporate plaintiffs "won 9 0% of the cases in which they sued individuals and lost only 50% of the
cases in which individuals sued them"); Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small
Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV. 433, 508 (1990) (using random sample of small

claims cases from Polk and Johnson Counties and all small claims cases from Keokuk county; finding
that when businesses sued individuals, businesses won 84% of the cases by default judgment and 14%
of the cases at trial; individual won 2% of the cases at trial); Hillard M. Sterline & Philip G. Schrag,
De/ault Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?, 67 DENv. U.L. REV. 357, 361 (1990)

(using random sample of cases from D.C. Small Claims Court in 1988; reporting: "Two hundred eightyseven files of suits against consumers were selected. Two hundred thirteen of them (74%) had resulted
in default judgments. In another sixty-three cases (22%), the defendant had appeared in court but
consented to pay everything asked for by the plaintiff. In eleven cases (4%), the plaintiff had
voluntarily dismissed the case. Of the 287 files sampled, none had resulted in a trial."); Barbara
Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Reviewof the Small Claims

Literature, 9 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 219, 244-45 (1975) (finding plaintiff win rates ranging from 85% to
100%); URBAN JUSTICE CTR., DEBT WEIGHT: THE CONSUMER CREDIT CRISIS IN NEW YORK CITY AND

ITS IMPACT ON THE WORKING POOR 17-18 (Oct. 2007) (using random sample of 600 consumer debt

cases filed in New York City Civil Court in February 2006; reporting: "In 81.8% of the cases reviewed
in our study, the court entered a default judgment against the defendant.. . . A much smaller percentage
of cases, 5.9%, were settled by both parties. ... 3.2% of the cases were unilaterally discontinued by the
plaintiff and 4.5% were filed but never served on the defendant. In others [apparently 6%], the case
appeared to be still pending. Not a single case went to trial or was otherwise adjudicated on the
merits."), available at http://www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/publications/CDP Debt Weight.pdf.
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arbitration and some are resolved in court-and that the differing
adjudication is not random but determined by the parties-itself is a
difference that introduces possible selection bias into the sample.
Moreover, to the extent we study judgments and awards, differential rates
of settlement among the venues also might bias our results.
Because of these limitations, we cannot determine definitively how
outcomes for cases brought by creditors in arbitration compare to outcomes
for cases brought by creditors in court. That said, we can say that nothing
in our study provides any evidence of biased outcomes in arbitration. The
outcomes we observe appear to be the result of the type of case being
adjudicated rather than differences between arbitration and litigation.
Moreover, the study does definitively demonstrate that win rates in
arbitration alone do not show that arbitration is biased. The win rates for
creditors in claims they brought in court are as high as or higher than the
win rates for claims brought by creditors in arbitration.
Part 11 describes the data sources used in this article. Part III presents
our empirical results, comparing creditor win rates and recoveries and
consumer response rates in debt collection cases in arbitration to debt
collection cases in court. Part IV sets out the results of our initial
regression analysis, controlling for important differences among the cases.
Finally, Part V concludes by summarizing our findings and discussing the
implications of this article for the broader debate over consumer arbitration.
II. DATA SOURCES
This part describes the data sources on which we rely in this article.
The arbitration cases we examine are consumer arbitrations administered
by the American Arbitration Association, including both individual debt
collection claims brought by creditors against consumers and claims
brought by a single debt buyer as part of a consumer debt collection
program administered by the AAA. The court cases we examine are cases
involving unpaid student loans in federal court and a more general sample
of debt collection cases from Oklahoma and Virginia state courts.
All of the cases in the sample, both in arbitration and in court, involve
attempts by creditors to collect unpaid debts from consumers. As such, at a
fundamental level the cases are similar. Moreover, debt collection cases
tend to present relatively simple legal issues-was the debt incurred and
did the consumer pay? At that level, too, the cases are similar. That said,
the cases differ in various respects, most notably as to the type of creditor
and the amount sought. These characteristics of the cases are described in
more detail in the following sections.
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INDIVIDUAL AAA DEBT COLLECTION ARBITRATIONS

The individual AAA debt collection arbitrations we studied are debt
collection cases filed by a variety of creditors against individual consumers
and administered by the AAA as part of its consumer arbitration caseload
(as distinguished from the debt collection program arbitrations described in
the next section). They consist of both awarded cases and non-awarded
cases. The awarded cases are included in the 301 AAA consumer
arbitrations closed by an award between April and December 2007" (the
"AAA case file sample"), which are described in our Preliminary Report
issued in March 2009.20 Just over twenty percent (61 of 301, or 20.3
percent) of the cases in the AAA case file sample involved claims brought
by businesses against consumers, typically as creditors seeking to recover
amounts allegedly owed by consumers for services rendered or goods
supplied. To enhance comparability with the court cases we studied, we
excluded from the sample three cases brought by business claimants that
likely should not be classified as debt collection cases. 21
The non-awarded cases are included in an additional 406 cases that
were closed during the same period other than by an award, either
administratively, by settlement, or by the claimant's withdrawal of its
claim. Of those cases, 47 appear to be brought by business claimants.
Because of AAA policies on the retention of original case files, we were
not able to review the files for the non-awarded cases. As a result, we rely
on the AAA's coding of outcomes in those cases, although acknowledging
uncertainty as to its reliability. 2 2 Overall, then, the individual AAA
consumer arbitrations in our sample consist of 58 awarded cases and 47
non-awarded cases, for a total of 105 cases.
The most common types of creditors in the sample were home
builders (24.8 percent), law and accounting firms (23.8 percent), consumer
finance companies (including credit card issuers) (15.2 percent), and real
estate brokers (13.3 percent). The average amount sought by the creditors
in the cases in the sample was $20,445.47.23

19. The focus on cases closed by an award during this time period was based on the availability of
the original case files. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 9, at 37.
20. For more information on the AAA case file sample, see id. at 37-38.
21. Two of the cases involved disputes over payment of insurance payouts, and one case involved
a request by a business to remedy defective goods.
22. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 9, at 52.
23. For awarded cases, the average amount sought (which we were able to verify from the AAA's
files) in individual AAA debt collection arbitrations was $22,136.55; for non-awarded cases, the
average amount sought (which we were not able to verify from the AAA's files) was $18,313.23. The
overall average is what is reported in the text.
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AAA DEBT COLLECTION PROGRAM ARBITRATIONS

Beginning in September 2007, the AAA began administering a
program of debt collection arbitrations filed by a single buyer of consumer
debt. 24 We refer to these cases as "AAA debt collection program
arbitrations" to distinguish them from the individual consumer arbitrations
filed by creditors seeking to recover amounts allegedly owed by
consumers, described in the previous section.
The first awards under the program were issued in March 2008, and
over 80 percent of the total awards under the program were issued between
September 2008 and February 2009.25 While the program was ongoing,
arbitrators issued a total of 16,500 awards. In these awarded cases, the
creditor sought an average of $1172.20.26 Another 2,785 cases, including
all cases withdrawn prior to March 18, 2009, were resolved in other ways. 27
The creditor withdrew all 27,839 remaining claims between mid-March
2009 and June 2009, so that by June 2009, the creditor had withdrawn all
remaining cases it had filed under the program. At the time the AAA
adopted its debt collection arbitration moratorium, it was no longer
administering any cases under the program.
Subject to a confidentiality agreement, the AAA made its electronic
database of debt collection program arbitration data available to us. The
database recorded whether a case was resolved by an award, withdrawn, or
closed administratively; whether the consumer respondent participated in
the case; whether the creditor won some relief in the case; and the
percentage of the amount sought by the prevailing creditor that it was
awarded. Because the arbitrators filled out an electronic template in
making their awards,28 the award data in the database were directly entered
by the arbitrators through the template. We then verified the data in a
24. All the claims in the AAA's debt collection program arbitrations were for amounts owed on
wireless phone customer accounts, which had been purchased by a third party debt buyer. The claims
were generally two or more years old and had already been through the original wireless company's
own collection process. For further description of the AAA debt collection program arbitrations, see
Appendix A. For an early report on outcomes under the program, based on data disclosed by the AAA,
see FederalArbitration Act, supra note 11, at 8.
25. The Searle Civil Justice Institute Preliminary Report, supra note 9, did not deal with these
awards because they were issued after the time period covered by that report; data collection for the
Preliminary Report was complete before the bulk of awards under the debt collection program were
issued.
26. Unlike many of the other debt collection claims we studied, the creditor in the AAA debt
collection program arbitrations sought to recover only the past due amounts billed but not interest on
those amounts. Due to the AAA's data collection process, only awarded cases contained information
on the amount claimed without including costs. As such, we could not accurately calculate the average
amount sought in cases that were not resolved by an award.
27. The cases resolved in other ways include cases that were withdrawn, cases that were closed
administratively, and cases that were rejected for lack of notice to the consumer (which often were in
the form of an award).
28. See app.A.
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sample of 408 cases by examining the original electronic case files, and
corrected the data as described in Appendix B.
C.

FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN COLLECTION CASES

Data compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO)
are widely used by researchers studying outcomes in federal court cases. 29
Few debt collection cases, however, are brought in federal court.30 One
exception is cases brought by or on behalf of the U.S. government to
collect unpaid student loans. Because the federal government is the
plaintiff in such cases, it can file suit in federal court despite the relatively
low amounts sought (i.e., amounts well below the amount in controversy
required for diversity cases). 31
We examined the AO data on all federal civil cases terminated
between late 2006 and late 2007 (the most recent period for which data
were available at the time of the study) coded as involving unpaid student
loans.3 2 Our sample consists of those cases in which a prevailing party is
recorded in the dataset and for which the amount demanded33 was recorded
as a non-zero amount. 34 To correct obvious coding errors in the data, we
examined federal court docket sheets available on Westlaw, and, when
necessary, the electronic court files using PACER.3 5 Because we limited
the sample to cases in which one party or the other was coded as prevailing,
we excluded cases that were settled, dismissed, or otherwise withdrawn
before a final judgment was entered.
The resulting sample consists of 382 cases in which the federal
government sought to recover unpaid student loan amounts from a
consumer. The time period covered (between late 2006 and late 2007) is
similar to the time period for the individual AAA consumer arbitrations
29. 1For a list of studies, see, e.g., Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research,
Citation Search Results for 8429, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/biblio/studies/8429/
resources (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
30. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES OF
CHANGE 55 (Feb. 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf

31. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2010) (no amount in controversy requirement for cases in which the United
States is plaintiff).
32. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATABASE, 2007 (DSl: Civil
Terminations Data, 2007) (ICPSR Study No. 22300) (last updated June 23, 2009), available at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/22300.xml ("nature of suit" variable coded as 152).
33. See Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office ofthe
U.S. Courts Database. An Initial EmpiricalAnalysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1461 n.33 (2003)
(identifying limitations on "amount demanded" variable). Those limitations are less troubling here
because of the nature of the claim: a liquidated amount owed for failure to pay back a student loan. We
verified the amounts demanded against the original complaint when there was a reason to question the

amount as coded.
34. We limited the sample to these cases so that we could calculate win rates and the percent of the

amount claimed recovered by the creditor using the data in the dataset.
35. See appendix C for further discussion of errors in the Federal Court/AO) dataset.
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studied. The amount sought by the government (i.e., the creditor) in the
cases in the sample averaged $17,185.86-similar to the amount sought in
the individual AAA debt collection arbitrations but much larger than the
amount sought in the AAA debt collection program arbitrations. One
respect in which student loan collection actions brought by the federal
government differ from other debt collection actions is that there is no
statute of limitations for recovery of unpaid student loans, so that no statute
of limitations defense is available to the consumer.36
D.

STATE COURT DEBT COLLECTION CASES

As already indicated, most debt collection cases are brought in state
court, rather than federal court. 37 But systematic data from state courts are
much less available. 3 8 In this article, we present data on debt collection
cases from Oklahoma and Virginia state courts. We studied those two
states solely for reasons of data availability: Oklahoma provides good
online access to case dockets, while we were able to obtain a preexisting
dataset of debt collection cases brought in Virginia state courts.
1.

Oklahoma State Court Cases

The Oklahoma state court cases consist of a sample of cases closed
between March 31, 2007, and January 1, 2008 (the same time period used
for our original study of AAA consumer arbitrations). We used Oklahoma
as the source of the data because of the ready availability of docket sheets
and court filings online. Unlike the web pages of other state court systems,
the Oklahoma court web page permits searches by classes of cases and
dates of filing, facilitating the collection of a sample of cases. Not all
Oklahoma counties make court dockets available online, and, of those that
do, not all provide access to all filings in the cases. We limited our data
collection to those counties that make all filings available online.39
The Oklahoma district courts are divided into three divisions for civil
claims: claims seeking more than $10,000, claims seeking less than
36. 20 U.S.C. §1091A(a) (2006). We appreciate Paul Bland pointing out this difference in his oral
testimony at a hearing of the Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the House Oversight Committee. See
Arbitration or Arbitrary, supra note 7 (statement of Paul Bland).
37. See supra text accompanying note 30.
38. The most commonly used dataset on state court cases is the Civil Justice Survey of State Trials.
See generally Civil Justice Survey of State Trials, NAT'L ARCHIVES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA,

http://www.icpsr.umich.edulcocoon/NACJD/SERIES/00071.xml (last visited October 4, 2010). But
because so few debt collection cases go to trial, that dataset is of little use to us.
39. Those counties are rural and mixed rural-urban counties: Adair County, Canadian County,
Cleveland County, Garfield County, Logan County, Payne County, and Pushmataha County.
Oklahoma County, the county in which Oklahoma City is located, provides online access to court
filings, but does not include the complaint among the documents available online. Tulsa County, where
Tulsa is located, has docket sheets available online, but does not provide online access to court filings.
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$10,000, and small claims. 4 0 Because most AAA debt collection
arbitrations involved relatively small stakes, 4 1 we focused on the latter two
classes of cases. We selected a random sample of 500 cases from each of
the divisions, and excluded cases that were not debt collection cases (most
commonly, eviction actions) and cases between two businesses or two
individuals.
The resulting sample consists of 421 cases seeking less than $10,000
and 336 small claims cases filed in Oklahoma district courts from rural and
mixed rural-urban counties. Of the 421 cases filed in the under $10,000
division, 419 were brought by creditors seeking to recover unpaid debts;
only two were brought by consumers against businesses. The average
amount sought was $4,750.28. The majority of the creditor claims (245 of
419, or 58.5 percent) were brought by a party other than the original
creditor, either a debt collection agency or debt buyer. This is not
surprising, because Oklahoma law precludes such parties from suing in
small claims court.42 Of the 336 cases filed in the small claims division,
330 were brought by creditors seeking to recover unpaid debts; only six
were brought by consumers against businesses. The average amount
sought was $1,284.78.
2.

Virginia State Court Warrant in Debt Cases

The Virginia cases are a statewide random sample of cases from 2005
collected by Professor Richard Hynes for a research project on debt
collection lawsuits in Virginia.43 We limited the sample to warrant in debt
cases 4 4 brought by consumer finance companies, medical service providers,
law firms, and other businesses against consumers.4 5 We verified the data
against online case information available from the Virginia court system.
The information available online did not include the actual case filings, but
40. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 91.2 (West 2010); Okla. Sup. Ct. Admin. Directive 99-87 (Dec. 16,
I999), reprinted in Supreme Court Administration Directive - Unifbrm System of Designating and
Numbering Cases, 70 OKLA. B.J. 3875 (1999). Small claims are those seeking less than $6,000. OKLA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 12

§ 175 1(A)

(West 2010).

41. The average amount sought in the awarded AAA debt collection program cases was $11,72.20.
Almost 95% (55 of 58) of the individual AAA debt collection arbitrations sought less than $75,000, and
about 34% (20 of 58) sought less than $10,000.
42. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 175 1(B) (West 2010) ("No action may be brought under the small
claims procedure by any collection agency, collection agent, or assignee of a claim . . . ."). We have not
collected data on cases filed in the over $10,000 division of the Oklahoma district courts.
43. Richard M. Hynes, Broke But Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60
FLA. L. REV. 1, 46 (2008). We very much appreciate Professor Hynes' willingness to make his data
available to us.
44. Warrant in debt cases are claims seeking recovery of money, which would include tort cases,
for example, as well as debt collection cases. But it seems unlikely that many claims by businesses
against consumers would involve tort claims. See id.
45. To enhance the comparability of the claims to our individual AAA consumer arbitrations, we
excluded claims brought by governments (not including public universities) and landlords.
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rather a summary information sheet. We verified the coding received from
Professor Hynes against the summary information sheet, but were not able
to verify the coding against the actual case filings.
The sample consists of 283 cases brought by businesses against
consumers. While the dataset includes data on the amounts awarded to the
prevailing party, it does not include data on amounts sought by plaintiffs.4 6
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This part reports the findings from our study of debt collection cases
in arbitration and in court. It addresses four issues: (1) the extent to which
creditors win some relief (creditor win rates) in arbitration and in litigation;
(2) the extent to which prevailing creditors are awarded the amounts they
claim (creditor recovery rates) in arbitration and litigation; (3) the extent to
which cases are disposed of other than by an award in debt collection
arbitration or other than by a judgment in debt collection litigation (rate of
other case dispositions); and (4) the extent to which consumers respond to
claims (consumer response rates) in arbitration and litigation.4 7 Our
findings are subject to several limitations, described in more detail above. 4 8
First, the arbitration findings are limited to debt collection arbitrations
administered by the AAA and are not necessarily representative of all
arbitrations. Second, the court findings are not based on a national sample
of cases and may differ in other court systems. Third, cases adjudicated in
arbitration and litigation necessarily are different in respects that make
comparisons difficult.
A.

CREDITOR WIN RATE

As explained above, 49 the win rate of creditors in arbitration, either
alone or when compared to the win rate of consumer claimants in
arbitration, does not itself provide a meaningful evaluation of outcomes in
arbitration. Instead, to evaluate outcomes in arbitration, creditor win rates
in arbitration must be compared to creditor win rates for comparable cases
in court. This section seeks to undertake such a comparison.

46. Given that creditors ordinarily are awarded a high percentage of the amount sought in debt
collection cases, the average amount awarded provides some information on the amount sought by
creditors. In the Virginia cases, prevailing creditors were awarded an average of $2,144.14 per case
(based on 185 cases with prevailing creditors).
47. See app. D (providing a breakdown of the results underlying these finding by venue). Note
that in all the calculations in this part, we excluded cases in which notice was not given or process was
not served. For tests of statistical significance after controlling for relevant factors, see the regression
results infra Part IV.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 12 15.
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Table 1 summarizes win rates of creditors in individual AAA debt
collection arbitrations, AAA debt collection program arbitrations, federal
court student loan collection cases, and state court cases from Oklahoma
and Virginia. A case was treated as a win when the creditor was awarded
some amount from the consumer, other than court or arbitration costs. 50
The win rate is measured as a percentage of total judgments or awards,
consistent with how we defined win rate in prior research. 5 '
As shown in Table 1, the cases with the lowest creditor win ratesthat is, the cases in which consumers fared the best-were the AAA debt
collection arbitrations. In the individual AAA debt collection arbitrations,
creditors won some relief in 86.2 percent of awarded cases, 52 while in the
AAA debt collection program arbitrations, creditors won some relief in
97.1 percent of the awarded cases. By comparison, creditors won some
relief in 98.4 percent of the Virginia state court cases, in 99.7 percent of the
federal student loan collection cases, in 99.3 percent of the Oklahoma debt
collection cases under $10,000," and in one-hundred percent of the
Oklahoma small claims cases going to judgment.

50. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 9, at 67.
51. Id.

52. The Searle Civil Justice Institute Preliminary Report focused on claims brought by businesses,
rather than simply debt collection claims, and found that business claimants won some relief in 83.6%
of the cases they brought. See id. at 67-68. Of the business claims studied, however, three cases likely
should not be classified as debt collection cases. See supra text accompanying note 21. The consumer
prevailed in two of the three cases. With those cases excluded, the business won some relief in 50 of 58
(or 86.2%) of the cases in the sample. Another eleven cases involved claims by a business to keep a
deposit paid by the consumer. Those cases differ from more traditional debt collection cases in that the
business already has possession of the money it is seeking to recover. But they are similar in that the
business is asserting a claim for money alleged to be owed by a consumer. Accordingly, in our view it
is appropriate to treat such claims as debt collection claims for purposes of this analysis. If those claims
72
are excluded, businesses prevailed in 41 of the 47 cases (or 8 . %) that clearly were debt collection
cases in the sample.
53. The win rate (99.3%) reported here differs marginally from preliminary results reported in
See Arbitration or Arbitrary, supra note 7
testimony before the House Oversight Committee.
(testimony of Christopher R. Drahoial reporting win rate of 99.7%). The win rate previously reported
did not consider dismissals; here, we classify as a consumer win one case in which the court vacated a
default judgment in favor of the creditor and dismissed the case against a consumer. This change
reduces the creditor win rate from 99.7% to 99.3%.
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1: Creditor Win Rates in Arbitration Court, Claims Broi

The results in Table 1Iinclude adjudications both in contested cases
(e.g., cases resolved on summary judgment or after a hearing) as well as in
uncontested cases (e.g., default judgments and ex parte arbitration awards).
Most of the judgments in debt collection cases in court, and many awards
in debt collection arbitrations, are entered in uncontested cases. 54 Because
the creditor almost always wins in the uncontested cases in our sample,
those cases may not be the best types of cases to use in evaluating whether
arbitration is biased in favor of creditors.
Accordingly, Table 2 summarizes win rates in contested debt
collection cases in AAA arbitration and in court. Because of the frequency
of default judgments and ex parte awards in debt collection cases, the
number of contested cases is only a small fraction of the total number of
judgments and awards in the sample, so that the sample sizes for the
percentages in Table 2 are much smaller than those in Table 1. Again, the
cases with the lowest creditor win rates-that is, the cases in which the
consumers fared the best-were the AAA debt collection arbitrations. In
contested cases in which arbitrators ruled on the merits, creditors won some
relief in 77.8 percent of the individual AAA debt collection arbitrations and
either 64.1 percent or 85.2 percent of the AAA debt collection program
arbitrations. The lower creditor win rate for AAA debt collection program
arbitrations (64.1 percent) is derived from the cases in which we could
verify in the electronic record that the consumer had in fact participated in
the case. The higher creditor win rate for AAA debt collection program
arbitrations (85.2 percent) is derived from all cases identified by the
arbitrator as cases in which the consumer participated, even if we could not
verify the fact of consumer participation from the file. Even the higher
creditor win rate is in line with creditor win rates in contested court cases,
which range from a low of 80.0 percent in Oklahoma cases under $10,000
to a high of one-hundred percent in Oklahoma small claims cases.

54. See infra app.D.
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CREDITOR RECOVERY RATE

Win rates, of course, provide only a partial picture of outcomes in
arbitration and in court. The standard measure of win rates, which we also
use, treats all cases in which the prevailing party is awarded some relief as
a win for that party, regardless of whether the party is awarded all or only a
small part of the relief to which it is legally entitled. To examine possible
variations in the degree of creditor success, this section looks at creditor
recovery rates-i.e., the percentage of what the creditor was seeking that it
was awarded.
Table 3 sets out one measure of creditor recovery rate: the percentage
of cases in which a prevailing creditor was awarded one-hundred percent
(or more) of the amount it sought.5 Table 4 sets out a related measure of
creditor success: the average percentage of the amount sought that was
awarded to a prevailing creditor." The pattern shown in both tables is
almost identical. Prevailing creditors recover the lowest percentage of
what they are seeking in individual AAA consumer arbitrations, while they
recover the highest percentage of what they are seeking in Oklahoma state
court cases under $10,000. The recovery rate of creditors in AAA debt
collection program arbitrations is similar to the recovery rate in debt
collection cases in court, with the exception of Oklahoma small claims
cases, in which the recovery rate is lower.

55 The issue more commonly arises in calculating consumer wins in arbitration, when use of the

win rate to measure consumer success may overstate how well consumers fare. E.g., Peter B Rutledge,
Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO

J.L.

PUB. POL'Y 549, 557 (2008).

When the creditor is the claimant, a

high win rate similarly may overstate the degree of creditor success (or understate how well consumers
fare) in a particular venue.
56. For the Virginia warrant in debt cases, we do not have data on the amount sought by the
plaintiff because that data is not available in the Virginia courts online database. Accordingly, those
cases are not included in the results reported in this section.
57. Consistent with the Preliminary Report, we calculated the percent recovery for creditors as the
amount of damages awarded divided by the amount of damages sought. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST.,
supra note 9, at 69.
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Table 3: Percentage of Cases in which Creditor Was Awarded 100% of Amount Sought, Claims Brought by

were more than the amount claimed, almost always because interest continued to accrue while the case was
pending. In those cases, the creditor was awarded the full amount of principal sought, and so accordingly we
capped the recovery at 100% of the amount claimed.
**Data on the amount awarded were missing in two of the cases. In the four cases in which the creditor was
awarded less than 100% of the amount sought, the percent ranged from 30% to 97%. In the case in which the
creditor was awarded thirty percent of the amount sought, the creditor sought to recover the collateral for the loan
as well. The difference between the amount sought and the amount awarded may reflect the value of the
collateral.

**The percent recovery here (92.9%) differs from the percent recovery in the Preliminary Report (93.0%), see
Searle Civil Justice Institute, supra note 9, at 69, because of the exclusion of one case in which the creditor
prevailed that likely was not a debt collection case. In that case, the creditor was awarded 100.0% of the amount
sought.

C.

RATE OF OTHER CASE DISPOSITIONS

The measures of win rates discussed above focus on cases in which
the court entered a judgment or the arbitrator made an award, consistent
with the definition of a win in our Preliminary Report." Such a measure
does not, however, take into account other possible case dispositions such
as settlements or dismissals that do not necessarily result in entry of
judgment or making of an award.5
58. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 9, at 67.
59, A settlement may be turned into a judgment (an "agreed judgment" or a "consent judgment")
or an award (an "award on agreed terms"). The tables in Appendix D identify the numbers of such
settlements. We did not include them in the win rates described in Parts III.A and 1l.B because they
were not adjudications by the court or the arbitrator. In most cases the settlement awarded the creditor
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To provide some sense of how other case dispositions compare in
court and in arbitration, Table 5 summarizes the percentage of cases that go
to an award (in arbitration) or a judgment (in court) as a percentage of the
total cases in which notice was given to the consumer respondent (by
service of process or otherwise)." The individual AAA debt collection
arbitrations had the highest rate of other case dispositions (44.8 percent),
while the AAA debt collection program arbitrations had the lowest rate
(13.2 percent). The court cases we studied were in between, ranging from
22.1 percent to 35.0 percent.
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish reliably between
settlements and dismissals for most of the samples we studied. The AAA
identified a number of , settled
cases among the individual AAA debt
'''
collection arbitrations, but did so by relying on self-reporting by the parties,
which may not be accurate." -Withdrawals by the creditor in the AAA debt
I may be due to settlements, although that
collection program arbitrations....
seems unlikely." Regardless, we have no way of determining whether that
is so. Further, dismissals in court typically are sought by the creditor, but
we have no way to verify whether they are due to settlement or some other
reason. Thus, we are unable to draw any firrn conclusions about the nature
of the other dispositions and how they might be relevant to how consumers
fare in debt collection cases. That said, based on the available data, there is
no obvious pattern suggesting that cases in arbitration differ systematically
from cases in court in this regard.
If we were able to characterize the nature of the other dispositions
more precisely, it might have some effect on our win rate estimates. Some
dismissals might be adJudications in favor of the consumer; indeed, we
classify two cases as consumer wins in which the court vacated a default
the full amount sought, although usually subject to a payment schedule to be followed by the consumer.
f, n
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judgment in favor of the creditor and dismissed the claim against the
consumer. But not all dismissals, even ones that do not result from
settlements, are necessarily adjudications in the consumer's favor."
Moreover, it may well be that many, if not most, of the dismissals are due
to settlements. If so, the varying rates of other case dispositions will not
have a significant effect on the win rates discussed above. 64
One possible explanation for the varying rates of other case
dispositions is that they may be related to the frequency with which a
consumer fails to respond in the case. When consumers fail to respond, the
most likely outcome is a default judgment or ex parte award. As a result,
types of cases with low consumer response rates are likely also to have a
low rate of other (i.e., non-judgment) case dispositions. The next section
examines consumer response rates in debt collection cases in arbitration
and in court.
D.

CONSUMER RESPONSE RATE

A commonly expressed concern about debt collection cases in general
is that consumers do not appear in court or in arbitration to defend against
the claim. Indeed, the AAA has stated that a low response rate in its debt
collection program arbitrations was an important reason why it imposed a
moratorium on its administration of such cases.6 " Consumer response rates
may also explain the rate of other (non-judgment and non-awarded) case
dispositions, as discussed in the previous section.
Calculating the rate at which consumers respond in court and in
arbitration is subject to the same difficulties described in the previous
section: in some cases, such as dismissals sought by the creditor in court, it
can be difficult if not impossible to determine whether the consumer in fact
responded to the case. Accordingly, Table 6 reports consumer response
rates as a range of percentages. The lower figure for each venue is the
percentage of cases in which we have a high degree of confidence that the
63. FED. TRADE COMM'N, MATTER NO. P094806, DEBT COLLECTION: PROTECTING CONSUMERS
106 (Aug. 5, 2009) (statement of Julie Nepveu, "I have talked to attorneys that say to me when someone
shows up to court to defend a lawsuit, they do get dismissed, and they file it again at another time and
hope to catch the person out of court one day and default them. It's not unheard of and it's very
common in certain jurisdictions."), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollectround/
090805-CHILtranscript-90805.pdf.
64. And by definition they have no effect on the recovery rates, because recovery rates are
calculated only for cases with prevailing creditors.
65. FED. TRADE COMM'N, MATTER No. P094806, DEBT COLLECTION: PROTECTING CONSUMERS
33 (Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Richard Naimark, "[c]onsumer debt claim collection cases are fairly
dramatically different in form. For instance-and I think perhaps this is maybe the most significant
issue, and we heard a lot about it yesterday also in the court process-extraordinarily high rates of
nonappearance or nonparticipation by consumers, maybe going over 90 percent, extremely high rates of
nonparticipation, which creates a systemic problem."), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
workshops/debtcollectround/090805-CHIL/transcript-90806.pdf
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consumer in fact did appear-because there is evidence the case settled, the
consumer in fact filed a response in the proceeding, and so forth. Uncertain
cases are classified as cases in which the consumer did not appear. The
higher figure is the percentage of cases in which the consumer might have
appeared. Uncertain cases are classified as cases in which the consumer
did appear. Thus, the range sets out the minimum and maximum consumer
response rates in the debt collection cases studied.
The consumer response rate in the individual AAA debt collection
arbitrations we studied is substantially higher than the consumer response
rate in the other types of cases, regardless of how the rate is defined.
Conversely, the consumer response rate in the AAA debt collection
program arbitrations is lower than the consumer response rate for the other
types of cases, almost without exception. The consumer response rate in
the court cases is in between.
Fable 6: Consumer Response Rates in Arbitration and in Court, Claims Brought by Creditors
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attempts to control for those factors using regression analysis are likely to
be unreliable. Another possibility that has been suggested is that consumers
do not recognize communications from arbitration providers (as opposed to
courts) as important, and so fail to respond.6 6 Again, we cannot test for this
The response rate in the individual AAA consumer
possibility.
arbitrations, however, which is higher than in the court cases studied, does
suggest that consumer response rates are not inherently poor in arbitration,
and that other factors, such as those discussed above, do play a role.
66. FED. TRADE C'OMM'N, MATTER NO. P094806, supra note 65, at 34 (statement of Paul Bland),
see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 57.
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IV. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
As discussed above, the cases in the sample are all debt collection
cases, and thus are roughly comparable as a general matter." A limitation
of the results in the previous part is that they do not control for differences
among the cases as to the amount claimed by the creditor, whether the
consumer respondent failed to appear, the type of creditor, and so on. This
part attempts to control for those differences using standard multivariate
techniques. Data for the regressions were compiled from the data sources
described previously, and the findings in this part are subject to the same
limitations."
After controlling for identifiable differences among the cases, our
results appear consistent with the results in the previous part. First, the
analyses suggest that creditors win at a lower rate (i.e., that consumers fare
better) in the arbitrations studied than in court. That finding holds both for
individual AAA debt collection arbitrations and for AAA debt collection
program arbitrations. Second, we find no statistically significant difference
in the percent recovered by prevailing creditors between the arbitrations
and court cases studied. 69
A.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DATASET

We used information from cases with awards or judgments70 in
individual AAA debt collection arbitrations, AAA debt collection program
arbitrations, federal student loan collection cases, and the state court debt
collection cases in Oklahoma to construct the dataset used in the
regressions. For the AAA debt collection program arbitrations, we used a
random sample of 300 awarded cases (rather than the entire 16,500
awarded cases) to make the sample more comparable in size to the samples
of cases from the other venues." Because the amount demanded was not
available for the Virginia state court cases, we could not include those
cases in the dataset. The final dataset contains 1,139 cases.
We then created variables for whether the creditor claimant won the
case, whether the case ended with a default judgment or ex parte award, the
amount demanded by the creditor, and the percentage of the amount sought

67. See supra Part II.
68. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
69. The models in this part are designed to test whether the results from the previous part hold after
controlling for some identifiable differences among the cases.
70. Excluding consent or agreed judgments or awards.
71. The results in Tables 1, 3, and 4 (for the entire population of AAA debt collection program
arbitrations) generally hold for the sample of 300 such cases used in the regressions (the number of
contested cases in the sample was too small to replicate Table 2). In other words, we have every reason
to believe the sample is representative of the population as a whole.
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that the creditor was awarded. Indicator variables72 for the venue type (i.e.,
whether the case was resolved in individual AAA debt collection
arbitration, AAA debt collection program arbitration, or court) and for the
creditor type (i.e., whether the creditor was the government, a bank or other
lender, a service provider such as a law firm or accounting firm, or a debt
buyer) were also developed.
B.

CREDITOR WINS

We first examined the relationship between arbitration and the
likelihood the creditor wins the case. The CREDITOR WIN variable can
only take the values of 0 and 1, and we chose to use standard linear
regressions for our models." The key variables are the arbitration variables
(VENUEARBPROGRAM, VENUEINDIVARB, and VENUEALL_
ARB), which measure the likelihood that creditors win in arbitration
relative to court.7 4 A positive coefficient indicates that creditors are more
likely to win in arbitration than in court (i.e., that consumers fare better in
court). A negative coefficient indicates that creditors are less likely to win
in arbitration (i.e., that consumers fare better in arbitration). We included a
set of controls for whether the judgment or award was entered by default,
the amount claimed by the creditor, and the type of creditor claimant.75
Our results appear in Table 7 below. 76
Model 1 in Table 7 suggests that a creditor claimant has a lower
likelihood of winning in arbitration than in court (statistically significant at
the 1 percent level). Specifically, the fact that a case is decided in
arbitration decreases the likelihood of a creditor win by about 3.1 percent
as compared to a case heard in court, after controlling for default by the
72. Indicator variables are those that take the values 0 and I only.
73. Justification for use of the linear probability model in situations with discrete dependant
variables can be found in James J. Heckman & James M. Snyder, Linear Probability Models of the
Demandfor Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Prefrences of Legislators 1-5

(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W5785 1996), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-4607. However, our results are also generally robust to logit and probit models.
74. Because the central debate focuses on how outcomes in arbitration compare to outcomes in the
likely alternative venue (i.e., court), many of our analyses group all AAA debt collection arbitrations
together and separately group all debt collection cases in court together for purposes of comparison.
Certainly, each court and each type of AAA arbitration have different outcomes, so it is possible that
different types of debt collection arbitrations are better suited for comparison to debt collection cases in
certain courts. That analysis is left to other scholars.
75. Because the Virginia cases cannot be included, all bank claimants in the remaining cases win
so there is no variation to exploit. As such, the set of indicator variables for creditor claimant type for
these models include only the government, service providers, and debt buyers. To prevent the perfect
collinearity that would be caused by including all three creditor type indicator variables, we dropped the
variable that indicated whether a case was brought by a debt buyer due to its high correlation to the
arbitration venue.
76. There is likely some multicollinearity in these models due to the relationships between the
venues and creditor claimant types. As such, the results should be interpreted with caution.
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consumer, the amount claimed by the creditor, and the type of creditor
claimant. Note that one of the strongest factors contributing to a creditor
claimant win is whether the consumer failed to appear such that the
judgment or award was by default (RESPDEFAULT).n By comparison,
the type of creditor claimant does not seem to have an effect on the
Model2 in Table 7 shows that
likelihood of a creditor win.
VENUEALLARB continues to be significant at the five percent level even
after controlling for the possibility that observations within each venue are
correlated in such a way that causes correlation in the modeling errors
associated with venue.
Model 3 in Table 7 is identical to Model 1 except that it separates out
the effects of individual AAA debt collection arbitrations and AAA debt
collection program arbitrations, rather than combining them in a single
arbitration variable. For both types of cases, the fact that the case is
decided in arbitration as opposed to court has a statistically significant
negative effect on the likelihood a creditor will win. Again, default
judgments are important and statistically significant indicators of whether a
creditor claimant will win, and creditor type seems to have no statistical
effect.
Table 7: OLS Regressions, Creditor Wins as the Dependent Variable

Standard errors in parentheses

77. Using our data, we cannot determine whether defaulting consumers lose because they do not
show up, or whether they do not show up because they have a weak case and are likely to lose anyway.
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Generally, these models seem to confirm our results from Part Ill.
After controlling for differences among the cases, the fact that a case is
heard in arbitration appears to be associated with a decreased likelihood of
a creditor win (i.e., consumers fare better in the AAA debt collection
arbitrations studied than in court). These results hold for AAA debt
collection arbitrations in the aggregate, as well as for individual AAA debt
collection arbitrations and AAA debt collection program arbitrations
separately.
C.

CREDITOR RECOVERY RATE

We also examined the relationship between arbitration and the
percentage of the amount claimed that was awarded to a prevailing
creditor. The CREDITOR RECOVERY RATE variable is a percentage with
most of the data clustered at one-hundred percent, and we chose to use
standard linear models for the regressions." Again, the key variables are
the arbitration variables (VENUE ARBPROGRAM, VENUEINDV ARB,
and VENUEALLARB), which measure the recovery rate for prevailing
creditors in arbitration relative to court. A positive coefficient indicates
that creditors are likely to recover a higher percentage of the amount
claimed in the arbitrations studied than in court. A negative coefficient
indicates that creditors are likely to recover a lower percentage of the
amount claimed in the arbitrations studied. We included the same set of
controls as in the previous set of regressions, but added CREDITORBANK
because it does vary in these models. These models contain only 1,117
observations because we only considered cases in which the creditor won.
Our results appear in Table 8 below.
In Table 8, the combined arbitration variable has a negative sign and is
not statistically significant. In other words, in the cases studied, creditors
recovered a lower percentage of the amount sought in arbitration than in
litigation, but we cannot say that the venue has any statistical effect on the
creditor recovery rate. When individual AAA debt collection arbitrations
are considered separately from AAA debt collection program arbitrations
again neither variable is statistically significant, although the coefficients
have a negative sign. In both Model I and Model 3, the fact that a creditor
is a service provider (e.g., a law firm or accounting firm) has a statistically
significant negative relationship to the creditor recovery rate at the one
percent and five percent levels. This finding is to be expected: consumers
likely have a greater ability to challenge the amounts billed by law firms
and accounting firms than they do credit card debts or debts acquired by
debt buyers. The fact that a bank is a creditor also has a statistically
significant negative relationship to the recovery rate, although both the
78. Generalized linear models (GLMV) with logit links produce similar results to those in Table 8.

Winter 2011

CREDITOR CLAIMS

101

magnitude of the effect and its statistical significance are lower. Again, this
finding is unsurprising since consumers likely can more readily challenge
debts owed to banks than the older debts acquired by debt buyers.
Government creditors also have a statistically significant negative
relationship to the recovery rate as compared to debt buyers.
Fable 8: OLS Regressions, Creditor Recovery Rate as the Dependent Variable

Standard errors in parentheses

Generally, these models again seem to confirm our results from Part
III. After controlling for differences among the cases, we do not find any
statistically significant difference in creditor recovery rate due to the case
being resolved in arbitration rather than in court.7 9
Because creditors may select into certain venues, our results may be
subject to selection bias. In an attempt to test the robustness of our results,
we performed several other analyses, including the use of a propensity
score estimator and propensity score matching. Both of these analyses can
be used to determine the average effect of going to arbitration
(VENUEALL ARB) on the creditor win rate and the prevailing creditor
recovery rate while attempting to control for non-random selection into
arbitration.

79. As noted above, see supra text accompanying note 66, the consumer response rate data are too
uncertain to attempt regression analysis using that data.
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The propensity score estimator was constructed by first running a
probit model for VENUE ALLARB on whether the consumer defaulted,
the demand amount, and controls for debt buyer and service provider
creditors, and then calculating the predicted values in STATA, which are
used as the propensity scores. The propensity scores were then used with
VENUEALLARB in OLS regressions with CREDITOR WIN and
CREDITOR RECOVERY RA TE as dependent variables respectively.
We constructed the average treatment effect (ATE) of
VENUEALLARB on CREDITOR WIN and CREDITOR RECOVERY
RATE respectively by matching on the propensity score variable discussed
above. We used four matches as suggested by Abadie et al. "because it
offers the benefit of not relying on too little information without
incorporating observations that are not sufficiently similar." 80
Table 9 shows that regardless of the model used, VENUEALLARB
has a similar relationship to CREDITOR WIN and CREDITOR RECOVERY
RATE respectively. This finding provides some confidence in our initial
linear models.
Fable 9: Comparison of the Coefficient on VENUEALLARB
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studied than in court. When creditors did prevail, we found no statistical
80. Alberto Abadie et al., Implementing Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects in
STA TA, 4 STAT[A J. 290, 298 (2004).
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difference in the amount they were awarded as a percentage of the amount
sought in AAA debt collection arbitrations as compared to court. To the
extent that consumers fared better in the AAA arbitrations studied than in
the court cases studied, it may well be that differences in case
characteristics for which we were not able to control explain the
differences. Thus, we do not claim that arbitration outcomes are better for
consumers than outcomes for comparable cases in court. Nonetheless, at a
minimum, these findings should dispel the notion that high creditor win
rates and recovery rates in debt collection arbitrations show that arbitration
is unfair to consumers. Creditor win rates and recovery rates were as high
or higher in the court cases we studied. Moreover, these findings provide
no support for any claim that AAA debt collection arbitrations are biased in
favor of creditors. Consumers fared at least as well in AAA debt collection
arbitrations as in the court cases we studied. 8 '
The results are mixed when it comes to rates of other dispositions and
consumer response rates. We found no systematic differences between
arbitration and litigation in the disposition of debt collection cases other
than by award or judgment. As for consumer response rates, in the
individual AAA debt collection cases we studied, consumers responded at a
higher rate than in the court cases we studied. In the AAA debt collection
program arbitrations we studied, consumers responded at a lower rate than
in the court cases we studied. Our finding of relatively low response rates
in the AAA debt collection program arbitrations is consistent with an
important reason given by the AAA for imposing a moratorium on
administering such arbitrations: the low rate at which consumers appeared
and contested the claim. But as with win rates and recovery rates, these
findings suggest that the consumer response rates may be due to
characteristics of debt collection cases rather than the venue-court or
arbitration-in which those cases are resolved.
As discussed above, our findings are subject to several limitations.
First, the findings on arbitration are limited to AAA debt collection
arbitrations.
Empirical results from studying AAA debt collection
arbitrations do not necessarily apply to other types of arbitration or other
arbitration providers. But as we have indicated elsewhere, in setting
national policy concerning arbitration, information on consumer
arbitrations administered by the AAA, a leading provider of arbitration
services, certainly is necessary for making an informed decision." Second,
our findings on debt collection actions in court necessarily are limited to
the courts studied. That said, our findings appear broadly consistent with

81. These findings also suggest the possibility that consumers may not be better off having their
debt collection claims resolved in court than in arbitration (at least arbitrations as administered by the
AAA).
82. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 9, at 3.
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previous studies of debt collection cases in court.83 Third, to the extent we
focus on court judgments and arbitration awards, differential settlement
rates among the venues might bias our results. Fourth, cases are not
selected into arbitration randomly; thus, finding truly comparable cases
between court and arbitration is extremely difficult. Indeed, the fact that
one set of cases is selected into arbitration while the other is selected into
court is itself a difference for which we cannot fully control. That said, to
the extent "there now appears to be a consensus that the future of
arbitration should be decided by data, not anecdote," 84 this article
contributes additional data to the policy debate.
APPENDIX A. PROCEDURES IN AAA DEBT COLLECTION
PROGRAM ARBITRATIONS 85
As a general matter, the AAA administered the debt collection
program arbitrations under its Supplementary Procedures for the
Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes" and the Consumer Due Process

Protocol." The procedures differed from the procedures in the individual
AAA debt collection arbitrations we studied, however, in several
significant ways.
First, the AAA charged reduced fees to the creditor and to consumers
in the debt collection program arbitrations, and staggered those fees
throughout the arbitration process."
For example, under the AAA's
consumer procedures, a consumer would have to pay his or her share of the
arbitrator's fees ($125 for claims seeking $10,000 or less) to proceed with a
claim or counterclaim." For AAA debt collection program arbitrations, the
fee was reduced to $50. In addition, the fee charged to the creditor was
staggered over the course of the arbitration: only a portion of the total fee
was due on filing of the claim, with additional amounts due the further the
claim proceeded through the arbitration process.

83. See sources cited supra note 18.
84. Peter B. Rutledge, Common Ground in the Arbitration Debate, I Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 1, 8

(2009) (emphasis omitted).
85. The descriptions in this appendix are based on discussions with AAA personnel knowledgeable
about the program, and are consistent with our observations from reviewing a sample of electronic case
files.
86. Consumer-Related

Disputes

Supplementary

Procedures,

AMERICAN

ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION, (rules effective Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 [hereinafter AAA
Consumer Rules].
87. National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, Consumer Due Process Protocol,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (April 17, 1998), www.adr.org/sp.asp?=22019.
88. The reduced fees were possible because the electronic system the AAA used to administer the
arbitrations resulted in lower administrative and processing costs. Cost savings came from electronic
data and document transfer, a pre-screened pool of arbitrators, use of desk arbitration, and automating
document handling.
89. AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 86 ("Fees and Deposits to Be Paid by the Consumer").
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Second, although a fee was assessed against a consumer who asserted
a counterclaim, the AAA would upload directly to the electronic case file
any documents submitted by consumers regardless of whether they paid the
required fee.
Third, notice was given differently in the AAA's debt collection
program arbitrations. The AAA sent a written, paper initiation letter to the
consumer respondent, with electronic transmission to the creditor. Initially,
the AAA sent initiation letters to the consumer via certified mail, return
receipt requested." When it became evident that many initiation letters
were being returned without being signed for, the AAA switched to mail
requiring "delivery confirmation," under which the postal carrier would
confirm the date and time the initiation letter was left at the mailing
address. After switching to delivery confirmation, the AAA re-mailed
initiation letters in cases in which the consumers did not sign for a certified
mail delivery.
Fourth, the AAA pre-screened arbitrators to avoid conflicts of interest
and to expedite the arbitrator selection process. The AAA identified
attorney-arbitrators who were already on an AAA panel and invited them to
serve as arbitrators in debt collection program arbitrations. Potential
arbitrators filled out a pre-screening questionnaire that enabled the AAA to
create a pool of arbitrators who had no relationship with the creditor or any
of its parent or related companies. Arbitrators were also asked to agree to
The creditor had no involvement in the
serve for reduced fees.
identification, screening, or training of the arbitrators.
Fifth, arbitrators were selected randomly from the pool of prescreened arbitrators located in the same state as the consumer.9 1 Because
the system's software permitted the AAA to rotate through the arbitrators
in a given state as cases were filed, case managers did not have to appoint
an arbitrator individually in each case.
Sixth, to streamline the awards process, an award template was
created. Arbitrators prepared the award by entering data in fields on the
template, along with text comments if desired. The template was used to
prepare the written award in the case, which was mailed to the consumer
respondent and sent electronically to the creditor. The arbitrator was able
to affix his or her signature to the award electronically.
The AAA and the creditor took six to nine months to develop the
software, set up the electronic file transfer system, and create the capability
for case information to be assigned to individual arbitrators and made
available to them. Arbitrators were also screened and trained during this
time.
90. The creditor had already sent its own notice to the consumer requiring a signed receipt
verifying delivery. An electronic copy of that receipt was included with the documents the creditor
provided as part of its case filing.
91. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 65, at 146-47 (statement of Richard Naimark).
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APPENDIX B. DATA VERIFICATION AND CORRECTION FOR AAA
DEBT COLLECTION PROGRAM ARBITRATIONS
Because most information for the AAA debt collection program
arbitrations was processed and stored electronically, we were able to use
the original electronic files to verify the information for a sample of 408
awarded and non-awarded cases. The cases we reviewed were ones for
which we sought more information on what had happened in the case or in
which the coded data for the case contained an inconsistency.
We first reviewed the files for 99 non-awarded cases: 19 of the cases
were closed administratively; 60 were withdrawn before March 2009 and
did not have award dates entered in the database; and 20 were withdrawn,
but had award dates entered in the database. We were able to verify the
available information in the database for all of the cases except for the 20
withdrawn cases with award dates. In those cases, the award date was
entered in error; no award had been made in any of the cases. Note that it
was not usually clear from the information in the files why the cases had
been withdrawn. Of the 99 case files we examined, 16 (16.2 percent)
contained some explanation for the withdrawal or administrative closing.
In the majority of those cases (9 out of 16, or 56.3 percent), the case was
closed because the consumer respondent had requested that the dispute be
resolved in small claims court, as permitted by the Consumer Due Process
Protocol.
We then used the electronic case files to verify the information for a
sample of 309 awarded cases. For some of the cases, the information in the
database appeared inconsistent; for others, we reviewed a random sample
of the cases to make sure there were no inconsistencies. Specifically we
reviewed:
* 1 case in which the creditor appeared not to have made a claim;
* 17 cases in which creditor appeared to have been awarded over
one-hundred percent of the amount claimed;
* 30 cases in which the creditor was listed as the prevailing party
but appeared to have been awarded zero percent of the amount
claimed;
* 50 cases in which the consumer was listed as the prevailing party
and the creditor appeared to have been awarded zero percent of
the amount claimed;
* 50 cases in which the creditor was listed as the prevailing party
and was awarded one-hundred percent of the amount claimed;
* 3 cases in which the creditor appeared to have been awarded onehundred percent of the amount claimed but in which the
prevailing party was listed as the respondent or neither;
* 50 cases in which the consumer was coded as having filed a
counterclaim;
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50 cases in which the consumer was coded as having participated
in the case by submitting at least one letter to the arbitrator;
* 50 cases in which neither party was listed as the prevailing party;
and
* 8 cases in which the filing or hearing fees were higher than in the
other cases in the sample.
Generally, we could verify most information on the awarded cases in
the electronic database using the case files. However, we identified and
corrected the following errors in the database:
The creditor made a claim in every case; the one case in which a claim
was shown as absent was corrected to show that the creditor was awarded
one-hundred percent of the amount claimed.
* The creditor was never awarded more than one-hundred percent
of the amount claimed. Instead, in 17 cases, the database
incorrectly listed the claim amounts. In those cases, the claim
amount was corrected with the result that the creditor was
awarded one-hundred percent of the amount claimed.
* According to the AAA, early in the process an error involving
the award template resulted in the creditor winning the case but
receiving no monetary award. In all 30 of the cases in which that
happened in the complete dataset, the arbitrator modified the
award to reflect the correct amount awarded, but the coding was
not corrected in the original database. We corrected the database
to reflect that the claimant was awarded one-hundred percent of
its claim in each of these cases.
* The three cases in which the creditor was awarded money but
was not listed as the prevailing party were corrected so that the
creditor is shown as the prevailing party.
* Arbitrators were not consistent in classifying the prevailing party
when the creditor did not prevail. For example, when a claim
was rejected for insufficient notice of the arbitration proceeding,
some arbitrators recorded the case as one in which neither party
prevailed, while other arbitrators recorded the case as one in
which the consumer prevailed. To enhance consistency, we
recoded the 808 awarded cases in which the creditor was not
awarded any monetary amount as follows:
o If the arbitrator gave insufficient notice as the primary
reason for the award, then the case was coded
"Neither-Notice"-i.e., neither party prevailed and
the claim was dismissed for lack of notice. This
coding is analogous to our treatment of cases in which
service of process was not made in the court cases we
studied.
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If the arbitrator simply indicated that he or she was
dismissing the case generally, then the case was coded
"Neither-Dismissed" i.e., neither party prevailed
and the claim was dismissed. In those cases, the
dismissal appeared to be without prejudice such that
the case could have been refiled.
o Two cases were coded "NA" because the arbitrator
did not fill in the award sheet for this category and did
not provide notes explaining his or her decision.
o If the case was not in the sample of cases for which
we reviewed the electronic case files and the
arbitrator did not provide notes explaining his or her
decision, then the case was coded consistently with
the arbitrators description (i.e., either the consumer
prevailed or neither party prevailed) in the original
award document.
o All other cases in which the creditor was not coded as
the prevailing party in the original database were
coded with the consumer as the prevailing party.
* Finally, it was not always possible to verify whether a consumer
participated or filed a counterclaim in the case based on the
documents available in the files. Often the file would not contain
any documentation from the consumer, but it is possible that
there was a communication that did not get placed in the
electronic file. In order to be consistent, we re-coded the
consumer participation variable based on the arbitrator's notes.
Therefore, we coded the consumer participation variable as "yes"
when we could definitively verify that the consumer participated
in the case; "maybe" when the case was originally coded as the
consumer participating but we could not verify that fact in the
file; and "no" when the case was originally coded as the
consumer did not participate.
The above changes and corrections are included in the results
presented in this article.
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APPENDIX C. ERROR RATES IN FEDERAL COURT/AO STUDENT
LOAN DATA
Previous studies have documented systematic errors in the data on
federal court cases available from the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (AO). 92 We likewise identified several systematic errors in
the data reported by the AO on actions seeking collection of unpaid student
loans, and corrected those errors before using the data in our analysis.
Two types of inconsistencies were apparent on the face of the data.
First, a significant number of observations reported zero values for amounts
that almost certainly should have been coded as some non-zero amount.
For example, the amount awarded (AMTREC) was often coded as zero,
even when the plaintiff was coded as having prevailed by default judgment
in the case. 93 While it is possible that a plaintiff might "prevail" by default
judgment and receive no monetary remedy, such cases are likely to be rare,
much rhrer than found in the uncorrected data.
Second, in a number of cases, when a non-zero amount was reported
for either the amount demanded (DEMANDED) or the amount awarded, the
amount appeared to be coded incorrectly. The coding instructions for the
dataset indicate that the amount demanded and the amount awarded are to
be coded in thousands of dollars.94 In a number of cases, it appeared that
this was not done. For example, in a number of entries, the amount sought
or amount awarded was coded as "9999," meaning that the amount sought
or awarded against an individual consumer for an unpaid student loan was
at least $9,999,OOO,95 an implausibly large amount of student loan debt for
someone to incur. Instead, of course, the amount entered was the full
amount of the judgment, rather than the amount in thousands of dollars. 96
A third type of error became apparent when we examined the docket
sheets in attempting to correct for the other two types of errors. In coding
the amount demanded and the amount awarded, principal and interest on
92. E.g., Eisenberg & Schlanger, supra note 33, at 1473; Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic
and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational
Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1305-1311 (2005); Gillian
K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical
Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 72328 (2004).
93. In addition, a substantial percentage of cases (1,094 of 1,480, or 73.9%) had the amount
demanded coded as zero. It is possible that the complaints in those cases did not specify an amount
demanded. But given that the cases were seeking recovery of easily quantified student loan debts that
seems unlikely. Because we limited our sample to those cases specifying a non-zero amount demanded,
none of these cases was included in the sample.
94. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Technology Training & Support Division,
Civil Statistical Reporting Guide ver. 2.1 07/1999 at 3:9, 3:21 (July 1999).
95. Only four digits were available for coding these amounts, so that the largest figure that could
be entered was 9999.
96. This error is particularly significant when calculating percent recoveries.
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the loan were often treated inconsistently. In some cases, the amount
demanded included both principal and interest, while the amount awarded
included only the principal, or vice versa.
Other types of coding errors, while occurring, were less common,
although still potentially significant. Several cases had errors in the coding
of the case disposition (DISP), most commonly default judgments coded as
a different disposition. Three cases in the sample had the prevailing party
(JUDGMENT) coded improperly-two incorrectly coded as consumer
wins, and one incorrectly coded as a default judgment for the government
(the default judgment was later vacated and the case dismissed).9 7
Overall, 171 of the 382 cases in the sample (or 44.8 percent) contained
at least one of these types of coding errors. As noted previously, we
corrected these errors before using the data in our analysis. The frequency
of the various types of coding errors is summarized in Table C.1:
Table CA: Coding Errors in Student Loan Collection Cases in Federal Court!/ AO Data

errors and three cases had three errors.

97. To take account of the possibility that our sample might be somehow biased against cases
resulting in wins by the consumer, we reviewed the entire sample of student loan cases (i e., including
those with zero coded as the amount demanded) for cases coded as consumer wins. Out of the 1,480
student loan cases, 12 (or less than 1%) were coded as wins for the consumer. When we examined the
docket sheets and files for those 12 cases, however, all of them were coded incorrectly. None actually
was a win for the consumer: either the cases were not properly classified as student loan cases, or they
in fact involved consent or default judgments in favor of the government.
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APPENDIX D. CASE OUTCOMES FOR CREDITOR CLAIMS:
SUMMARY TABLES
Table D.l: Outcomes in Individual AAA Debt Collection Arbitrations*

excluded three contested cases (two consumer wins; one business win) that likely should not be treated as debt
collection cases. We do not have sufficient information to make comparable adjustments for non- awarded cases,
and so we treated all non-awarded cases with business claimants as debt collection cases.
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Table D.3: Outcomes in Federal Court Student Loan Collection Cases

was vacated and the case was dismissed, based on the parties' agreement that the consumer was not liable for the
debt. Arguably, the case should not have been included in the sample at all, because the case was terminated in
2008, rather than in the sample period.
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Table D.4.a: Outcomes in Oklahoma State Court Cases.< $10,000, Creditor Claims
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Table D.4.b: Outcomes in Oklahoma State Court Cases. Small Claims. Creditor Claims

judgment setting out a payment schedule for paying off the debt. It is possible, but seems unlikely, that in those
cases the court ruled in favor of the creditor in a contested case, and only after the ruling did the parties work out a
payment schedule. If so, then some proportion of the agreed judgments would need to be reclassified as
judgments in favor of the creditor.
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